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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FIRST
UTAH,
TION,

SECURITY BANK OF
NATION AL ASSOCIAPlaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
EZRA C. LUNDAHL, INC., E.
CORDELL L UNDAJ:IL, SI-IYRLEEN B. LUNDAHL, EZRA C.
LUNDAHL and LE AT I-I A A.
LUNDAHL,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
11359

Answer To Petition For Rehearing
The plaintiff and respondent having petitioned this
court for a rehearing from its decision filed May 20,
1969, the defendants-appellants file their answer to petition for rehearing.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF
THE CASE
Plaintiff Bank seeks a rehearing on a decision of
1

the Supreme Court in the above-entitled matter which
was rendered May 20, 1969.
DISPOSITION IN PRIOR DECISION
In its May 20, 1969, decision the Supreme Court
reversed that part of the trial court's judgment allowing
the plaintiff Bank to charge the $8100.00 check against
the defendants and affirmed that part of the trial court's
judgment awarding defendants $893.93 on their counterclaim. Costs to defendants (appellants).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING
Defendants-appellants seek to have the Supreme
Court deny a rehearing on this matter and sustain the
court's decision rendered on May 20, 1969, as the decision of this court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants-appellants refer to the original statement of facts made by them in their original brief.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED SECTION 70A-4-212 UCA 1953 AS AMENDED.
2

POINT II
TI-IE COURT FULLY CONSIDERED AS
'
SIIO\VN BY lTS DECISION, ALL MATTERS
PERTAINING TO THE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUPREivlE COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED SECTION 70A-4-212 UCA 1953
AS AMENDED.
In plaintiff's petition for a rehearing it appears that
the plaintiff still is contending that there is no distinction between a "chargeback" and a "refund". While

th~~matter
was.se~t,
'n re ..t~~·
in e em~:_,
7t,-,, ~ M 1/-~u 1
w
,.,,-,v tMi

brief \On1page 18, and so was arg
at th eari g,
it still appears that the plaintiff cannot understand or
ref uses to admit the distinctions between those two terms
as used in Section 70A-4-212. When applied to the facts
of this case, as found by the jury, it is absolutely clear
that this court has correctly interpreted and applied
that governing section of the code.
Without repetitiously reciting all the authorities
set out in our brief on appeal, the following summary
is suggested:
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(a) The right to "charge back" and the right
to a "refund" are determined by this section 70A-4-212.
( b) "Charge back" relates to the funds of the
customer then on hand in the particular bank account.
(c) "Refund" is to obtain monies in some legal
manner from the customer when no monies are then i11
his account in that particular bank.
(d) Both the right to "chargeback" and to
"refund" terminate if the bank fails to act by its "midnight deadline".
( e) Under subsection ( 4) of 70A-4-212, the
bank has a right to "chargeback" an uncollected check
even though it is in some way negligent but it remains
liable in damages. For example, if a bank negligently
holds an uncollected check beyond its midnight dead-

i

l~~, -~:1!1_ !ti.ll ~h-<~ge~,~~,, tp~~ ~r1t~Z~~~s~ ~~~ rcul;~ttf,~-

tomer s acdo~£ut/ltheJilrylnd the court touriei that
the customer, Lundahls Inc., was "damaged" in the
amount, which was charged back, to-wit $893.93. This
provision was inserted to protect the bank against suits
by third parties for wrongful dishonor of a customer's
check, where a check failed to clear and be honored by
the bank only because of the chargeback. This is done
to protect the bank from damages potentially far in
excess of the original item. It is obvious that the damage
suffered by a customer whose account is erroneously
charged back will always be at least the amount improperly charged back to his account, plus any other
actual damages sustained.
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(£) The jury expressly found that the bank
was negligent in failing to notify Lundahls Inc. in the
time prescribed by law or other reasonable time about
the dishonored check.
(g) The bank "charged back" the dishonored
check against the Lundahl's account and obtained
$893.93 from that account damaging them in that
amount. If there had been sufficient monies in the customers' account to obtain $8,100.00, the face amount of
the check, the bank could have "charged back" that
amount under the code, even if negligent, but would
have remained liable in damages for that amount.
(h) The customer counter-sued the bank for
the damages it suffered as a result of the "charge back,"
to-wit: the sum of $893.93.
( i) No third parties, if any had been involved,
could have had a cause of action against the bank if
said third party had a check from the customer which
did not clear the customer's account due to "chargeback" by the bank. (See Official Comment No. 5 to
70A-4-212, quoted by plaintiff at page 6 of its petition
for rehearing) .

( j ) The bank being negligent as found by the
jury, had no right to a "refund".
(k} Section 70A-4-212 subsection ( 4} specifically refers only to "chargeback" and has no application to "refund" which remedies are entirely separate
5

and dis tin et. A full discussion of this distinction was
presented to this court in appellants' brief on appeal,
page 42-49. On page 45 we quoted the Editorial Boar<l
to the Uniform Commercial Code, who concluded:
"The official comments, however, show that
the omission of the right of refund in this subsection ( 4) was deliberate."
On page 46 we again quoted the Code's Edtiorial Board,
when they wrote:
"In our opinion there is no justification for
giving a negligent depository bank a right of
refund against a customer.
( 1) A bank, to obtain a "refund" must be
free from negligence.

(m) The jury in this case found the bank negligent.
( n) The conclusion is inescapable: The bank,
by "chargeback" obtained $_893.93 and damaged its
customer in this amount. They had no right of "refund"
under the fact of this case because of their negligence.
(o) This court's interpretation of 70A-4-212
in its announced decision is accurate and is consistent
with all of the authorities and should not be disturbed.
POINT II
THE COURT FULLY CONSIDERED, AS
SHO,VN BY ITS DECISION, ALL :MATTERS
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PERTAINING TO THE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
In answer to petitioner's contention that there was
no meeting of the minds between the bank and Lundahls, we call to the court's attention the question to the
jury, and its answer, concerning this very issue:
"4. Was there a complete accord and satisfaction between the parties on or about January 4,
1967, whereby all accounts were settled and compromised between the parties, including a promise, if any you find, on the part of the bank to
surrender up the written guaranty? Answer Yes
or No.

"Answer: We, the jury, agree on the first part
of Question No. 4 - there was complete accord
and satisfaction between the parties on Jan. 4,
1967. 'Ve find that the guaranty was included
in this said agreement."
The evidence is in the record and plaintiff-respondent cannot escape the fact that it was the intention of
Lundahls Inc. and Hesston Corp. to _settle all debts .of
Lundahl's Inc. with the bank, "direct and contingent"
and to satisfy all of Lundahl's legal obligations so that
Hesston Corp. could begin business without any fear
of claim of direct or contingent liabilities whatsoever.
The bank was fully aware of this agreement for it was
written into the escrow agrement which the bank held
and the final settlement took place in that very bank
with the participation of the bank's officials. It also
knew Hesston Corp. demanded a full and final settle7

ment of all debts. The jury found that the perso11al
guaranty was also included in the accord and satisfaction. The guaranty was by the Lundahls individually
for the purpose of guarantying the corporate debts of
Lundahls Inc.
The parties met for the purpose of making a full
and complete satisfaction of all claims, both direct and
contingent between Lundahls Inc. and the bank. The
amounts were agreed upon and a payment in consideration thereof in the total amount of $78,402.65 was giveH
to the bank at that time and accepted by them as payment in full.
There was no doubt in the jury's mind that this was
a complete accord and satisfaction and that the bank
accepted the same as such and agreed to return all instruments to the Lundahls Inc. including the guaranty.
CONCLUSION
The defendants and appellants respectfully request
this court deny a rehearing on this matter and that this
court's decision rendered on May 20, 1969, remain the
decision of this court.
Respect£ ully submitted,
MANN & HADFIELD
Walter G. Mann
Reed W. Hadfield
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